When Program Analysis Meets Bytecode Search: Targeted and Efficient
  Inter-procedural Analysis of Modern Android Apps in BackDroid by Wu, Daoyuan et al.
When Program Analysis Meets Bytecode Search:
Targeted and Efficient Inter-procedural Analysis of
Modern Android Apps in BackDroid
Daoyuan Wu1, Debin Gao2, Robert H. Deng2, and Rocky K. C. Chang3
1The Chinese University of Hong Kong
2Singapore Management University
3The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
  Contact: dywu@ie.cuhk.edu.hk
Abstract—Widely-used Android static program analysis tools,
e.g., Amandroid and FlowDroid, perform the whole-app inter-
procedural analysis that is comprehensive but fundamentally
difficult to handle modern (large) apps. The average app size has
increased three to four times over five years. In this paper, we
explore a new paradigm of targeted inter-procedural analysis that
can skip irrelevant code and focus only on the flows of security-
sensitive sink APIs. To this end, we propose a technique called
on-the-fly bytecode search, which searches the disassembled app
bytecode text just in time when a caller needs to be located. In this
way, it guides targeted (and backward) inter-procedural analysis
step by step until reaching entry points, without relying on a
whole-app graph. Such search-based inter-procedural analysis,
however, is challenging due to Java polymorphism, callbacks,
asynchronous flows, static initializers, and inter-component com-
munication in Android apps. We overcome these unique obstacles
in our context by proposing a set of bytecode search mechanisms
that utilize flexible searches and forward object taint analysis.
Atop of this new inter-procedural analysis, we further adjust the
traditional backward slicing and forward constant propagation to
provide the complete dataflow tracking of sink API calls. We have
implemented a prototype called BackDroid and compared it with
Amandroid in analyzing 3,178 modern popular apps for crypto
and SSL misconfigurations. The evaluation shows that for such
sink-based problems, BackDroid is 37 times faster (2.13 v.s. 78.15
minutes) and has no timed-out failure (v.s. 35% in Amandroid),
while maintaining close or even better detection effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Static analysis is a common program analysis technique
extensively used in the software security field. Among exist-
ing Android static analysis tools, Amandroid [63], [64] and
FlowDroid [17], [19] are the two most advanced and widely
used ones, with the state-of-the-art dataflow analysis capability.
Both perform the whole-app inter-procedural analysis that
starts from all entry points and ends in all reachable code
nodes. Such analysis is comprehensive but ignores specific
analysis requirements, and often comes at the cost of huge
overheads. For example, a dataflow mining study [20] based
on FlowDroid used a compute server with 730 GB of RAM and
64 CPU cores. Even with such a powerful configuration, “the
server sometimes used all its memory, running on all cores for
more than 24 hours to analyze one single Android app” [20].
As a result, small apps were often used in prior studies.
For example, AppContext [75] selected apps under 5MB
for analysis because they found that not enough apps could
be successfully analyzed by its underlying FlowDroid tool.
Although HSOMiner [53] increased the size of the analyzed
apps, the average app size is still only 8.4MB. Even for
these small apps, AppContext timed out for 16.1% of the
1,002 apps tested and HSOMiner similarly failed in 8.4%
of 3,000 apps, causing a relatively high failure rate. Hence,
this is not only a performance issue, but also the detection
burden. Additionally, third-party libraries were often ignored.
For example, Amandroid by default skipped the analysis of
139 popular libraries, such as AdMob, Flurry, and Facebook.
However, the size of modern apps keeps on increasing.
According to our measurement, the average and median size
of popular apps on Google Play have increased three and
four times, respectively, over a period of five years. With
these modern apps, we re-evaluate the cost of generating
a relatively precise whole-app call graph using the latest
FlowDroid, and find that even this task alone (i.e., without
conducting the subsequently more expensive dataflow analysis)
could be sometimes expensive — 24% apps failed even after
running for 5 hours each. Hence, a scalable Android static
analysis is needed to keep pace with the upscaling trend in
modern apps. Fortunately, security studies are usually inter-
ested only in a small portion of code that involves the flows
of security-sensitive sink APIs. For example, Android malware
detection [81] is mostly interested in the sink APIs that can
introduce security harms (e.g., sendTextMessage()), and
vulnerability analysis often spots particular patterns of the
code [30]. Therefore, it is possible for security-oriented tools
to perform a targeted analysis from the selected sinks.
In this paper, we explore a new paradigm of targeted
(v.s. the traditional whole-app) inter-procedural analysis that
can skip irrelevant code and focus only on the flows of
security-sensitive sink APIs. To achieve this goal, we propose a
technique called on-the-fly bytecode search, which searches the
disassembled app bytecode text just in time when a caller needs
to be located so that it can guide targeted (and backward) inter-
procedural analysis step by step until reaching entry points. We
combine this technique with the traditional program analysis
and develop a static analysis tool called BackDroid, for the
efficient and effective targeted security vetting of modern
Android apps. Since the whole-app analysis is no longer
needed in BackDroid, the required CPU and memory resources
are controllable regardless of app size. Such a design, however,
requires us to solve several unique challenges. Specifically, it
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is challenging to perform effective bytecode search over Java
polymorphism (e.g., super classes and interfaces), callbacks
(e.g., onClick()), asynchronous flows (e.g., AsyncTask.
execute()), static initializers (i.e., static <clinit>()
methods), and ICC (inter-component communication) in An-
droid apps. Note that these obstacles are different from when
they appeared previously [19], [63], where the challenge was
to determine object types instead of hindering the searches.
To overcome those obstacles in our context, we propose a
set of bytecode search mechanisms that utilize flexible searches
and object taint analysis. First, we present a method signature
based search that constructs appropriate search signatures
to directly locate callers for static, private, and constructor
callee methods. This basic search also works well for child
classes by just launching one more signature search with the
child class. Second, for complex situations with super classes,
interfaces, callbacks, and asynchronous flows, we propose
an advanced search mechanism, because directly searching
callers’ signatures in these situations would hit nothing. In-
stead, we first search the callee class’s object constructor(s)
that can be accurately located, and from those constructors, we
perform forward object taint analysis until reaching caller sites.
Third, we further propose several special search mechanisms,
including (i) a recursive search to determine the reachability of
static initializers; (ii) a two-time ICC search that first searches
for both ICC calls and parameters, and then merges their search
results; and (iii) an on-demand search for Android lifecycle
handlers, e.g., onStart() and onResume() methods.
Atop our new paradigm of inter-procedural analysis, we
further adjust the traditional backward slicing and forward
constant propagation to provide the dataflow tracking of sink
API calls. Specifically, we first generate a structure called self-
contained slicing graph (SSG) to record all the slicing informa-
tion and inter-procedural relationships during the search-based
backtracking. To faithfully construct an SSG, we not only
reserve the raw typed bytecode statements but also taint across
fields, arrays, and contained methods, as well as add off-path
static initializers on demand. On top of the generated SSGs,
we then conduct forward constant and points-to propagation
over each SSG node to propagate and calculate the complete
dataflow representation of target sink API parameters.
To evaluate BackDroid’s efficiency and efficacy, we com-
pare it with the state-of-the-art Amandroid [63], [64] tool in
analyzing modern apps for crypto and SSL misconfigurations,
two common and serious sink-based problems that were also
recently tested by Amandroid in [64]. Specifically, we first
select a set of 3,178 modern apps that have at least one million
installs each and also were updated in recent years as our basic
dataset. We then pre-search them to obtain 144 apps with all
the relevant sink APIs so that Amandroid would not waste its
analysis even without the bytecode search capability; other-
wise, the performance gap between Amandroid and BackDroid
could be larger. The average and median size of these apps are
41.5MB and 36.2MB, respectively. We use a default parameter
configuration of Amandroid and run both tools on a machine
with 8-core Intel i7-4790 CPU and 16GB of physical memory,
a memory configuration often used in many previous studies
(e.g., [53], [59], [75], [78]). Moreover, we give Amandroid
sufficient running time with a large timeout of five hours (or
300 minutes) per app (the timeout setting explicitly reported in
prior studies [18], [28], [53], [75] was 30, 60, and 80 minutes).
Our evaluation shows that BackDroid achieves much bet-
ter performance while its detection effectiveness is close to,
or even better than, that of Amandroid. First, BackDroid’s
overall performance is 37 times faster than that in Aman-
droid, requiring only 2.13min (or minutes) for the median
analysis time while that in Amandroid is 78.15min. Indeed,
BackDroid can quickly analyze one third of the apps within
one minute each (v.s. 0% in Amandroid), and 77% apps
can be finished within 10 minutes each (v.s. 17% in Aman-
droid). Moreover, BackDroid has no timed-out failure and
only three apps exceeding 30min. In contrast, the timed-out
failure rate in Amandroid is as high as 35%. On the other
hand, BackDroid still maintains close detection effectiveness
for the 30 vulnerable apps detected by Amandroid: BackDroid
uncovered 22 of 24 true positives and avoided 6 false positives.
Furthermore, BackDroid discovered 54 additional apps with
potentially insecure ECB and SSL issues. One half were due to
the timed-out failures, but the rest were caused by the skipped
libraries, unrobust handling of asynchronous flows/callbacks,
and occasional errors in Amandroid’s whole-app analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first introduce background and motivation in Sec. II, and
give an overview of BackDroid in Sec. III. We then present
BackDroid’s on-the-fly bytecode search technique in Sec. IV,
followed by the adjusted dataflow analysis in Sec. V. In Sec.
VI, we evaluate BackDroid and compare it with Amandroid.
After discussing the limitations and related works in Sec. VII
and Sec. VIII, respectively, we conclude this paper in Sec. IX.
Availability: To allow more usages of BackDroid and
facilitate future research, we will release the source code of
BackDroid on GitHub and maintain its further development.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
A. Android Static Analysis Background
Different from the classical program analysis (e.g., for Java
and C/C++) that handles only one entry point, static analysis
of Android apps needs to consider many entry points that
are implicitly called by the Android framework. These entry
points are the lifecycle handler methods (e.g., onCreate())
of different components registered in an app configuration
file called AndroidManifest.xml (or manifest thereafter).
An important task of Android static security analysis is to
test the reachability from entry points to security-sensitive
sink API calls. Since such control-flow reachability usually
involves multiple Java methods (or procedures, formally), an
inter-procedural, instead of intra-procedural, analysis is a must
in Android static analysis. Otherwise, we cannot determine
whether a sink API call is valid, i.e., not the dead code or
from uninvoked libraries (both are common in Android apps).
Existing Android static tools need to launch the whole-
app analysis for inter-procedural analysis. Specifically, before
they can perform any inter-procedural dataflow taint [34] or
backward slicing [29] analysis, they all generate certain kinds
of whole-app graphs. Some are constructed systematically,
such as a points-to graph for all objects in Amandroid [63],
a lifecycle-aware call graph in FlowDroid [19], a system
dependency graph in R-Droid [22], and a context-sensitive call
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TABLE I: A summary of average and median app sizes over a
period of five years from 2014 to 2018.
Year Average Size Median Size # Samples
2014 13.8MB 8.4MB 2,840
2015 18.8MB 12.4MB 1,375
2016 21.6MB 16.2MB 3,510
2017 32.9MB 30.0MB 1,706
2018 42.6MB 38.0MB 3,178
graph in CHEX [46], DroidSafe [35], and IntelliDroid [65].
Among them, Amandroid’s whole-app graph, generated along
with the dataflow analysis, is the most precise one. Others
are built in an ad-hoc manner and are thus less accurate,
e.g., a class hierarchy based control flow graph [28], [36],
[83], a method signature based call graph [39], and an intra-
procedural type-inference based call graph [23]. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first not to perform whole-app
analysis but still enable effective inter-procedural analysis.
To build Android static analyses, some common technical
tools are often used. Notably, the Soot [40] and WALA [13]
analysis frameworks have been used in many prior works. They
provide the underlying intermediate representation (IR), call
graph generation, and some basic support of data flow analysis.
In BackDroid, we also leverage Soot’s Shimple IR (an IR in
the Static Single Assignment form) to build our own dataflow
analysis but use bytecode search, instead of Soot’s call graph,
to support the inter-procedural analysis.
B. The Upscaling Trend of Modern App Sizes
Both Amandroid and FlowDroid were initially proposed in
2014. Although they are still being maintained and improved
over these years, handling large apps was not considered as a
design objective at the first place. However, as we will show in
this subsection, modern popular apps have increased their sizes
dramatically over a period of five years from 2014 to 2018.
This is not too surprising, considering that 1,448 of the top
10,713 apps studied in 2014 [50] had already been updated on
a bi-weekly basis or even more frequently. Note that although
app size increase is not fully due to code change (also related
to user interface XML code and resource change), it is the most
common metric used to describe an app dataset, and allows a
comparison between our and prior datasets (e.g., [53], [75]).
To measure the changes in the app sizes, we first obtain a
set of modern apps. Specifically, we collected a set of 22,687
popular apps on Google Play in November 2018 by correlating
the AndroZoo repository [16] with the top app lists available
on https://www.androidrank.org. Each app in this set had at
least one million installs on Google Play. We then recorded
the app sizes and DEX file dates (if any) in our dataset.
Table I summaries the average and median app sizes over
a period of five years from 2014 to 2018. We can see that in
2014, the average and median app size is only 13.8MB and
8.4MB, respectively. This number almost doubles in 2016, with
an average size of 21.6MB and a median size of 16.2MB. It
further doubles after two years, with an average app size of
42.6MB in 2018. This clearly shows that modern apps have
dramatically increased their app sizes, and they are expected
to further enlarge as more functionalities are added.
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Fig. 1: FlowDroid’s call graph generation time for a set of 144
modern apps (under a timeout of 5 hours each).
C. The Cost of Generating a Whole-app Call Graph for
Modern Apps
With modern apps, we now re-evaluate the cost of gen-
erating a relatively precise whole-app call graph. Specifically,
we measure the execution time required by FlowDroid 2.7.11
to analyze a set of 144 modern apps with the average size
of 41.5MB, under the same hardware configuration for our
experiments of BackDroid and Amandroid in Sec. VI. We
choose FlowDroid because it decouples the logic of call graph
generation and dataflow taint analysis (whereas Amandroid
cannot), which allows us to measure the cost of generating
call graphs only. To increase the precision of FlowDroid’s call
graph generation, we use the context-sensitive geomPTA [3]
call graph algorithm, instead of the context-insensitive SPARK
algorithm [2]. However, we do not launch IccTA [42] to further
transform the generated call graphs with inter-component
edges. This sacrifices certain accuracy but keeps stability.
We find that even generating a whole-app call graph alone
(without performing the subsequently more expensive dataflow
analysis) could be sometimes expensive. Figure 1 presents
FlowDroid’s call graph generation time for a set of 144 modern
apps. Although the call graphs of 31 (21.5%) apps could be
quickly generated within five minutes, the median time of
call graph generation in FlowDroid is still around 10 minutes
(9.76min) per app. Considering the total analysis time required
by BackDroid for the same set of apps is only 2.13min (see
Sec. VI), such a call graph generation is already 4.58 times
slower. Besides the performance concern, the detection burden
caused by timed-out failures is much more serious. We can see
that as high as 24% apps failed even after running for 5 hours
each, causing no any analysis result could be outputted for
these 34 modern apps among the total 144 apps.
III. OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES
Motivated by the incapability of whole-app inter-
procedural analysis to analyze modern Android apps, we
explore a new paradigm of targeted inter-procedural analysis
that can skip irrelevant code and focus only on the flows of
security-sensitive sink APIs. This new paradigm is enabled by
1It is the latest release at the time of our submission in May 2020. Note
that this version of FlowDroid has continued improving the performance on
top of the most recently published one in 2016 [11], [17] for over two years.
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Fig. 2: A high-level overview of BackDroid.
a technique called on-the-fly bytecode search, which searches
the disassembled app bytecode text just in time to guide tar-
geted (and backward) inter-procedural analysis until reaching
entry points. We implement this technique into a tool called
BackDroid, and further adjust the traditional backward slicing
and forward constant propagation to provide the dataflow
tracking of targeted sink APIs. Fig. 2 presents a high-level
overview of BackDroid, which works in the following four
major steps:
1) Preprocessing with disassembling bytecode into plaintext.
Given an input of any Android app(s), BackDroid first
extracts original bytecode and manifest files. After that, it
not only transforms bytecode into a suitable intermediate
representation (IR) as in typical Android analysis tools,
but also employs dexdump [1] to disassemble (merged,
if multidex [12] is used) bytecode to a plaintext.
2) Bytecode search for targeted inter-procedural analysis.
With the disassembled bytecode plaintext, BackDroid
immediately locates the target sink API calls by perform-
ing a text search of bytecode plaintext (in the bytecode
search space) and initiates the analysis from there (in the
program analysis space). To support the inter-procedural
analysis with no call graph, BackDroid performs on-the-
fly bytecode search to identify caller methods whenever
needed.
3) Performing the adjusted backward slicing to generate
SSG. To also provide the dataflow tracking atop our
search-based inter-procedural analysis, BackDroid per-
forms the traditional backward slicing but adjusts it into
our new context. Specifically, during the inter-procedural
backtracking, BackDroid generates a self-contained slic-
ing graph (SSG) for each sink API call to record all
the slicing information and inter-procedural relationships
resolved by search.
4) Forward analysis over SSG to propagate and calculate
dataflow. On top of the generated SSGs, BackDroid
launches the classical forward constant propagation [61]
to propagate and calculate dataflow facts from entry points
to sink APIs. It also propagates object points-to [41]
information to remove potential ambiguity. Eventually,
with the support of SSG, BackDroid is able to output
the complete dataflow representation (either a constant or
an expression) of target sink API parameters.
Challenges. Given that BackDroid is the first inter-
procedural analysis tool without relying on a whole-app graph,
its major novelty and biggest challenge is how to perform on-
the-fly bytecode search to locate caller methods in a backward
manner. This is difficult because of Java polymorphism (e.g.,
super classes and interfaces), callbacks, asynchronous Java/An-
droid flows, static initializers, and inter-component commu-
nication, all of which make a basic signature based search
infeasible. We will present our core search technique in Sec.
IV. Another challenge is how to adjust the traditional backward
slicing and forward analysis into our new paradigm of targeted
inter-procedural analysis. We will present its implementation
challenges and our corresponding solutions in Sec. V.
IV. ON-THE-FLY BYTECODE SEARCH
In this section, we present our novel bytecode search tech-
nique to locate caller methods on the fly, which is the key to
BackDroid’s targeted inter-procedural analysis. We first present
the basic signature based search in Sec. IV-A and an advanced
search mechanism with forward object taint analysis in Sec.
IV-B. We then elaborate three special search mechanisms from
Sec. IV-C to Sec. IV-E, on how to effectively search over
static initializers, Android ICC (inter-component communica-
tion), and Android lifecycle handlers (e.g., onStart() and
onResume() methods). Finally in Sec. IV-F, we describe
several implementation enhancements to the performance of
our bytecode search.
A. Basic Search by Constructing Appropriate Search Signa-
ture(s)
To illustrate our search process, we use a real popular
app, LG TV Plus2, which has over 10 million installs on
Google Play, as a running example. In Fig. 3, we have
already used initial bytecode search to find a target method
(i.e., the one with a sink API call), <com.connectsdk.
service.netcast.NetcastHttpServer: void
start()>. For inter-procedural analysis, our next step is
to uncover its caller method (i.e., <com.connectsdk.
service.NetcastTVService$1: void run()>)
and its call site (i.e., statement virtualinvoke
$r13.<com.connectsdk.service.netcast.
NetcastHttpServer: void start()>()). As
we will explain, searching its caller can be done directly with
the following (method) signature based search, because the
target callee method here is a private Java method.
The basic signature based search. As illustrated in Fig. 3,
we conduct the signature based search in five steps, which
are across not only the bytecode search space but also the
2https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lge.app1
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Virtual methods   -
#0              : (in Lcom/connectsdk/service/NetcastTVService$1;)
name          : 'run'
type          : '()V'
access        : 0x0001 (PUBLIC)
......
insns size    : 46 16-bit code units
13834c:                                   |[13834c] com.connectsdk.service.NetcastTVService.1.run:()V
13835c: 5450 b417                 |0000: iget-object v0, v5, 
Lcom/connectsdk/service/NetcastTVService$1;.this$0:Lcom/connectsdk/service/NetcastTV
Service; // field@17b4
138360: 2201 d207                 |0002: new-instance v1, 
Lcom/connectsdk/service/netcast/NetcastHttpServer; // type@07d2
......
1383ac: 5400 1318                  |0028: iget-object v0, v0, 
Lcom/connectsdk/service/NetcastTVService;.httpServer:Lcom/connectsdk/service/netcast/N
etcastHttpServer; // field@1813
1383b0: 6e10 b930 0000         |002a: invoke-virtual {v0}, 
Lcom/connectsdk/service/netcast/NetcastHttpServer;.start:()V // method@30b9
1383b6: 0e00                           |002d: return-void
Forward find call site via Soot
<com.connectsdk.service.NetcastTVService$1: void run()>
virtualinvoke $r13.<com.connectsdk.service.netcast.NetcastHttpServer: void start()>()
<com.connectsdk.service.netcast.NetcastHttpServer: void start()>
r0 := @this: com.connectsdk.service.netcast.NetcastHttpServer
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Fig. 3: Illustrating BackDroid’s basic bytecode search process using a signature based search example.
program analysis space (with Soot). Given a callee method,
we first translate its method signature from Soot’s IR format
to dexdump’s bytecode format to facilitate the search. With
the transformed method signature, we then search the entire
bytecode plaintext to locate all its invocation(s), as highlighted
in the bottom of Fig. 3. In the second step, we identify
the corresponding method that contains the invocation found
in the bytecode plaintext. Here it is com.connectsdk.
service.NetcastTVService.$1.run:()V, where an
inner class needs to add back the symbol “$”. With this caller
method signature (in bytecode format), we perform another
format translation in the third step, and locate its Java method
body via the program analysis in Soot. Next, we conduct a
quick forward analysis via Soot to find the actual call site in
the caller method body. With all these steps done, we finally
connect a edge from the caller (site) to the callee method in
SSG (self-contained slicing graph). Note that SSG is generated
during the process of bytecode search and backward slicing.
We will explain the details of SSG and its generation in Sec.
V-A.
After understanding this search process, we now turn to an
important question not answered yet: which kinds of (callee)
methods are suitable for the signature based search. We call
such methods signature methods. Typical signature methods
include static methods3 (either class or method is marked with
the static keyword), private methods (similarly, methods
declared with the private keyword), and constructors (e.g.,
<init> methods of a class). For some searches over child
classes, we can also simply launch the signature based search,
as explained next.
3It is worth noting that although the static <clinit> method of a class is
a signature method, it has to use a special search instead of the basic signature
based search, as we will explain in Sec. IV-C.
Searching over a child class. Suppose that the
NetcastHttpServer class in Fig. 3 has a child class called
ChildServer, we can still use the signature based search but
need to construct appropriate search signatures. Specifically,
it depends on whether ChildServer overloads the callee
method void start() or not. If it is not overloaded, an
invocation of the callee method start() may also come
from a child class object. Hence, besides the original signature
search, we add one more signature search with the child
class, namely Lcom/connectsdk/service/netcast/
ChildServer;.start:()V. The returned caller(s) might
come from both searches, or just one of them, depending on
how app developers invoke that particular callee method. On
the other hand, if ChildServer does overload the start()
method, we just need to perform only one search with the
original callee method signature. This is because the child
class search signature now corresponds to the overloaded child
method only.
B. Advanced Search with Forward Object Taint Analysis
Although the basic search presented in the last subsection
can handle many callee methods in an app bytecode, it is
not effective for complex cases with super classes, interfaces,
callbacks, and asynchronous Java/Android flows. Note that
these obstacles are different from the situation when they
appeared in the previous research [19], [63], where the
challenge was to determine object types instead of hindering
the searches. We first explain the difficulty of searching in
the case where NetcastHttpServer.start() in Fig. 3
has a super class method called SuperServer.start().
Under this condition, the original signature search may
not reveal any valid callers, because developers may
write code in this way: SuperServer server = new
NetcastHttpServer(); server.start();. In this
5
<com.connectsdk.service.NetcastTVService$1: void run()>
0 Determine that it implements Runnable interface’s run() method.
<com.connectsdk.service.NetcastTVService: void connect()>
specialinvoke $r11.<NetcastTVService$1: void <init>(NetcastTVService)>(r0)
staticinvoke <com.connectsdk.core.Util: void runInBackground(java.lang.Runnable)>($r11)
<com.connectsdk.core.Util: void runInBackground(java.lang.Runnable)>
r0 := @parameter0: java.lang.Runnable
staticinvoke <com.connectsdk.core.Util: void runInBackground(Runnable,boolean)>(r0, 0)
<com.connectsdk.core.Util: void runInBackground(java.lang.Runnable,boolean)>
r0 := @parameter0: java.lang.Runnable
interfaceinvoke $r1.<java.util.concurrent.Executor: void execute(java.lang.Runnable)>(r0)
$r1 = <com.connectsdk.core.Util: java.util.concurrent.Executor executor>S
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example, the bytecode signature of server.start()
is Lcom/connectsdk/service/netcast/
SuperServer;.start:()V. Hence, searching with
NetcastHttpServer’s method signature would hit
nothing. But we also cannot use super class SuperServer’s
signature to launch the search, because it could return callers
of the super method itself and other class methods that
inherit from SuperServer. Similarly, if a callee method
implements an interface, searching using the interface method
signature would not work because an interface method might
be implemented by arbitrary classes. Furthermore, searching
over callbacks and asynchronous Java/Android flows could be
even more difficult, because they employ different sub-method
signatures for a pair of caller and callee methods.
We design a novel mechanism to accurately handle all
these complex searches. The basic idea is that instead
of directly searching for caller methods, we first search
the callee class’s object constructor(s) that can be accu-
rately located via the signature based search. Right from
those object constructors, we then perform forward ob-
ject taint analysis until we detect the caller methods with
the tainted object propagated into. We depict this pro-
cess in Fig. 4, using the same LG TV Plus app. This
time the callee method is <com.connectsdk.service.
NetcastTVService$1: void run()>, which continues
the search flow in Fig. 3. We now present the involved four
steps.
Searching for the object constructor. After determin-
ing a callee method that requires advanced search in step
0 , we first retrieve all its constructors. In Fig. 4, the
callee class NetcastTVService$1 has only one con-
structor, void <init>(com.connectsdk.service.
NetcastTVService). We then launch a bytecode search
using this signature to accurately locate that the constructor is
initialized in a method called NetcastTVService: void
connect(), as shown in step 1 .
Propagating object using taint analysis. In step 2 ,
we perform forward propagation of the located constructor
object, i.e., $r11 in Fig. 4, using taint analysis. Specifically,
an object can be propagated via a definition statement, e.g.,
r0 := @parameter0: java.lang.Runnable, via an
invoke statement, e.g., runInBackground($r11), or via a
return statement. Therefore, we track only three kinds of state-
ments, namely DefinitionStmt [6], InvokeStmt [8],
and ReturnStmt [9].
Determining the ending method to stop. An important
step is to determine at which ending method our forward
analysis should stop. This is easy for the case of super
class, because we can simply stop at a tainted statement
with the same sub-method signature as the callee method.
However, it is difficult for the cases of interface, callback, and
asynchronous flow, because their sub-method signature might
be different from that in a callee method. Some previous works
(e.g., [36], [71], [77]) used the pre-defined domain knowl-
edge to connect those asynchronous flows, e.g., a common
example is to connect Thread class’s start() and run()
methods. However, in the example of Fig. 4, it will miss the
ending method Executor.execute(). We also tried the
flow mapping provided by EdgeMiner [26] but found that it
could contain over-estimated asynchronous flows, such as con-
necting 2,446 caller methods (e.g., WaveView.<init>()
and Thread.<init>()) to only a single callee method
MediaPlayer$OnErrorListener.onError().
To better determine the ending method, we propose a
mechanism that does not rely on prior knowledge but leverages
interface’s class type as an indicator to find a tainted parameter
that is directly propagated from the original constructor object.
For example, in Fig. 4, since the interface class type is java.
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lang.Runnable, we determine which on-path Java/Android
API call contains a tainted parameter that belongs to this class
type. Our forward analysis thus propagates the original $r11
object along the path highlighted, and eventually reaches at r0
in the statement Executor.execute(r0). Hence, it is the
ending method we need to identify in this example.
Maintaining and returning a call chain. Differ-
ent from the basic search that returns just one call
site, here we need to maintain and return a call chain,
i.e., the chain from NetcastTVService.connect()
to Util.runInBackground(Runnable) and further to
Util.runInBackground(Runnable,boolean). As-
suming that we just return one call site and one
caller method, the further backward search of Util.
runInBackground(Runnable,boolean) may return
multiple search results or flows, because this search is now
independent. However, the fact is that only the flow shown in
Fig. 4 could eventually trace back to the constructor object.
Therefore, to avoid mis-added flows, we maintain a call chain
during the forward taint analysis.
C. Special Search over Static Initializers
The basic and advanced searches presented in the last two
subsections are useful in most scenarios, but they are not
for handling some special search challenges. We thus further
propose several special search mechanisms. In this subsection,
we present a recursive search for static initializers.
A static initializer is the static <clinit> method of a
class, which may occasionally appear in a call path BackDroid
is backtracking. Resolving its caller methods is a must for
determining whether the corresponding call path is reachable
from entry points or not. However, it is impossible to directly
search static initializers’ callers, because they are never (ex-
plicitly) invoked by any app bytecode. Instead, <clinit>
methods are only implicitly executed by Java/Android virtual
machine (VM) when the corresponding classes are loaded to
the VM. Hence, we design a special search mechanism to
handle these on-path static initializers. Additionally, in Sec.
V-A, we will also show how to add back off-path static
initializers into our slicing graph for the complete dataflow
analysis.
We use another concrete example, the popular Heyzap4
advertisement library embedded in many apps, to illus-
trate our approach. In this example, when BackDroid back-
tracks the setHostnameVerifier() sink API invoked by
com.heyzap.http.MySSLSocketFactory, the analy-
sis comes to a static initializer of the com.heyzap.
internal.APIClient class. However, a further search of
the APIClient.<clinit>() initializer method would hit
nothing, as we have explained earlier. Normally, a forward
whole-app analysis approach can track into such initializer
method whenever it encounters a field or a method of the
APIClient class, but here it is unrealistic to launch back-
ward search of all fields and methods of APIClient. To
address this unique challenge in BackDroid, we propose a dif-
ferent approach that performs recursive searches to determine
only the control-flow reachability of a targeted <clinit>
4Heyzap was used to connect different advertisement SDKs, and has been
acquired by Fiber, a company providing the mobile monetization platform.
method. This is reasonable because <clinit> methods have
no dataflow propagation due to no parameter passing.
Formally, for a static initializer SI.<clinit>(), our
recursive search works as follows. BackDroid first launches
a search to find out a set of classes C = {c1, · · · , cn} that
invoke the SI class. It then determines whether any class
ci in this set is an entry component registered in the app
manifest. In the case of Heyzap’s APIClient class, since
no ci is an entry class, BackDroid continues to perform
the class search of each ci to determine whether any of its
contained classes is an entry class. This process repeats until
no more new class searched out or entry class identified.
For example, the APIClient class is invoked by the class
com.heyzap.house.model.AdModel, which is further
used by an entry class called com.heyzap.sdk.ads.
HeyzapInterstitialActivity. Therefore, we consider
the initializer APIClient.<clinit>() is reachable from
entry points and the associated call path is also valid.
Through the evaluation in Sec. VI, we have obtained
some convincing data in real apps to support our design in
this subsection. Among 37 unique static initializers that are
identified by our recursive search as reachable, we find that
all of them are actually reachable from entry components.
D. Special Search over Android ICC
In this subsection, we present another special search
mechanism to track data flows over Android-specific inter-
component communication (ICC), a fundamental code/data
collaboration mechanism on Android [51], [69].
Our search is based on the inner working mechanism
of Android ICC. Specifically, ICC is different from typi-
cal API calls because it relies on its Intent parameter
values to dynamically determine a target callee. A callee
could be explicitly specified by setting the target component
class (e.g., via Intent i = new Intent(activity,
HttpServerService.class);), or implicitly specified
by setting an Intent action that will be delivered by the
operating system (OS) to the target component.
Based on this observation, we propose a two-time
search mechanism to handle ICC. The basic idea is to
launch two searches: one for searching ICC calls (e.g.,
startService()), and the other for searching ICC parame-
ters. For the explicit ICC, the second parameter search directly
searches component class names, e.g., const-class .*,
Lcom/lge/app1/fota/HttpServerService;, while
for the implicit ICC, we search Intent action names instead.
After performing the searches, we merge the two search results
and check whether an ICC call satisfies both. If such an ICC
call exists, it is the caller method we are looking for.
E. Special Search over Android Lifecycle Handlers
The last specific search challenge is how to search
over Android lifecycle handlers, e.g., the onStart() and
onResume() methods in Activity components. Each life-
cycle handler could be an entry function, and they can be
executed in multiple orders [19]. Our strategy is to first deter-
mine whether the dataflow tracking finishes when reaching at a
lifecycle handler. If it does, we have no need to launch further
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SinkMtd
Method A
Method B
Method C
B1 B2 B3
Cross loop happens if C = A
Inner loop happens if B3 = B1
Fig. 5: Illustrating two kinds of loops during the backtracking.
search, since the tracked lifecycle handler is already an entry
method. Otherwise, we conduct a special search that leverages
existing domain knowledge [19] to further track other lifecycle
handlers that invoke the callee handler. Since there are only
four kinds of Android components, we can simply use domain
knowledge to handle all lifecycle handlers.
F. Implementation Enhancements
In the course of implementing these on-the-fly bytecode
searches, we identify and make several important technical en-
hancements to guarantee the performance of bytecode search.
Search caching. The first enhancement is to cache different
search commands and their corresponding results. This is
necessary because in a valid app analysis, BackDroid will
make a number of searches and a portion of them could
be executed repeatedly (especially when similar paths are
explored across different sinks). Caching can avoid repeat-
ing the same searches. We perform caching with different
granularities, including the caching of invoked class search,
caller method search, static or instance field search, and the
caching of various raw search commands. According to our
experiment in Sec. VI, the cache rate of our search commands
in each app is 23.39% on average, with the minimum at 2.97%
and the maximum up to 88.95%. This data demonstrates the
effectiveness of our search caching in BackDroid.
Sink API call caching. Multiple sink API calls might be
located in the same method (e.g., due to if-else statements)
that turns out to be unreachable from entry functions. To avoid
re-analyzing such infeasible sink API call, we cache each sink
API’s callee method signature and its reachability. If one sink
API call is located in a method that has been analyzed and is
not reachable, we then do not analyze this sink API call any
more. Our experiment shows that on average, 13.86% of sink
API calls in each app are cached, with the maximum cache
rate at 68.18%.
Method loop detection. The third enhancement is to
detect the potential dead method loop(s) in our inter-procedural
backward search and forward object taint analysis. Fig. 5
illustrates two kinds of method loops during the backward
analysis. First, a cross-method loop could happen during the
backward method search. In Fig. 5, our backtracking follows
the order of SinkMtd --> A --> B --> C. However, if
the method C is the same as the method A, an infinite search
loop happens. Besides the cross loop, an inner loop could
also happen. As shown in Fig. 5, the method B contains a
tainted invoke statement and it produces a method call chain
from B1 to B3. Suppose that B1 and B3 are the same, our
method tracking would then iterate. To mitigate the impact of
these dead loops, our backtracking will detect them and avoid
repeating the analysis.
Besides the backward analysis, our forward object taint
analysis in Sec. IV-B suffers from a similar issue. To
distinguish different loops in BackDroid’s running output,
we name all the four types of method loops as fol-
lows: the CrossBackward and InnerBackward types
in the backward scenario, and the CrossForward and
InnerForward types in the forward scenario. By detecting
at least one dead method loop per app, we can optimize the
path analysis of 60% apps in our experiment. Among the four
types of search loops, the CrossBackward loop is the most
common one.
V. ADJUSTING TRADITIONAL BACKWARD SLICING AND
FORWARD ANALYSIS
With the new paradigm of inter-procedural analysis enabled
by our on-the-fly bytecode search, we further adjust the tra-
ditional backward slicing and forward analysis to provide the
dataflow tracking capability [19], [63] in our context. As men-
tioned earlier in Sec. III, we generate a new slicing structure,
self-contained slicing graph (SSG), during the backtracking,
and perform forward constant and points-to propagation over
SSG to calculate valid dataflow facts.
A. Generating a Self-contained Slicing Graph (SSG)
Since our bytecode search reveals only inter-procedural
relationships and we do not have a whole-app graph, we need
our own graph structure to record all the slicing and inter-
procedural information during the backtracking. This graph
essentially reflects the partial app paths visited by our on-the-
fly analysis, and the information stored in it can be used by
forward analysis to recover the complete dataflow representa-
tion of target sink API calls. Below we first describe this graph
structure, and then present the implementation challenges we
overcame to generate it.
Defining a self-contained graph structure to record all
the slicing and inter-procedural information. We propose
a self-contained graph structure called self-contained slicing
graph (SSG) to cover all the slicing and inter-procedural
information generated during our backtracking. With this struc-
ture, we aim to cover the slicing information across differ-
ent parameters tracked, different paths traced, and different
kinds of bytecode instructions, besides recording the inter-
procedural relationships uncovered by our bytecode search.
Hence, it is different from the individual path-like slices
generated in typical Android slicing tools (e.g., [22], [39],
[83]). We currently design each SSG corresponding to one
unique sink API call, and we will also provide the per-app
SSG in the future. Fig. 6 shows an example SSG (simplified
for readability) that is automatically generated by BackDroid
for the app com.studiosol.palcomp3. Compared with
traditional slices, our SSG contains the following additional
information:
• Hierarchical taint map. Although not displayed in Fig. 6,
a hierarchical taint map is actually maintained during our
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com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD
<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: void <init>(int)><com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: void start()>
<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: void <init>(java.lang.String,int)>
<com.studiosol.palcomp3.Activities.PalcoMP3Act: void onCreate(android.os.Bundle)>
<com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: void <init>()>
<com.studiosol.palcomp3.SmartCacheMgr: void initLocalServer(Context)>
<com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: void <clinit>()>
specialinvoke r0.<java.lang.Object: void <init>()>()
r0.<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: java.lang.String hostname> = r1
r0.<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: int myPort> = i0$r10 = new java.net.InetSocketAddress
$r11 = r0.<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: java.lang.String hostname>
$i1 = r0.<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD: int myPort>
$r1 = new com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer
specialinvoke $r1.<com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: void <init>()>()
r0 := @this: com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD
i0 := @parameter0: int
specialinvoke r0.<NanoHTTPD: void <init>(String,int)>(null, i0)
$i0 = <com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: int PORT>
specialinvoke r0.<NanoHTTPD: void <init>(int)>($i0)
r0 := @this: com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD
virtualinvoke r1.<java.net.ServerSocket: void bind(java.net.SocketAddress)>($r10)
virtualinvoke $r3.<com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: void start()>()
specialinvoke $r10.<java.net.InetSocketAddress: void <init>(java.lang.String,int)>($r11, $i1)
r1 := @parameter0: java.lang.String
i0 := @parameter1: int
r0 := @this: com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD
r0.<com.studiosol.palcomp3.SmartCacheMgr: com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer mServer> = $r1 r0 := @this: com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer
$r3 = r0.<com.studiosol.palcomp3.SmartCacheMgr: com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer mServer>
specialinvoke r0.<com.studiosol.palcomp3.SmartCacheMgr: void initLocalServer(Context)>(r1) <com.studiosol.palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: int PORT> = 8089
return
Fig. 6: An SSG automatically generated by BackDroid, where the green block is a sink API call and the gray block is an entry point.
inter-procedural backtracking. Specifically, our SSG as-
signs a taint set to each tracked method and organizes all
sets hierarchically according to their method signatures.
We also maintain a global taint set for static fields.
• Inter-procedural relationships. Each time our bytecode
search uncovers an inter-procedural relationship, we will
record it into SSG as a cross-method edge. Recall that
in the running example of basic search in Sec. IV-A, we
connect an edge from the caller (site) to the callee method
in the fifth step after the search is done. Besides this kind
of common cross-method edges, it is also possible for
a tracked method to invoke its contained method, e.g.,
MP3LocalServer.<init>() in Fig. 6. We use both
calling and return edges for this special relationship.
• Raw typed bytecode statements. Lastly, to recover a
complete representation of sink parameters in the forward
analysis, it is necessary to keep raw typed bytecode
instructions in the SSG. We thus define a node structure
called SSGUnit to wrap the original bytecode statements
in Soot’s Unit format [10]. In this structure, we record
the node ID, the signature of corresponding method, and
most importantly, the typed bytecode Unit statement.
Backward taint analysis over fields, arrays, and con-
tained methods for the SSG generation. With the SSG
structure defined, we then perform backward taint analysis
to generate SSGs. Compared to the forward taint analysis
in Amandroid and FlowDroid, backward taint analysis is
more difficult because it reverses the normal program exe-
cution and thus has no insights on the earlier execution of
tainted variables. This problem is particularly noticeable for
fields, arrays, and contained methods, and we specifically
handle them as follows. First, for an instance field to be
tainted, e.g., r0.<com.studiosol.util.NanoHTTPD:
int myPort> in Fig. 6, we add not only the instance field
itself to the taint set but also its class object (i.e., r0) so that we
can trace the same field no matter the class object gets aliased
or across method boundaries. Moreover, when an instance field
needs to be untainted, we first remove obj.field from the
taint set and further detect whether there are more fields for
the same instance. If there are no other such fields, we remove
obj from the taint set as well. Arrays and Intent objects
are handled in a similar way. Hence, we skip the details here.
When there are static fields in the taint set, we need to
also analyze contained methods (e.g., MP3LocalServer.
<init>() in Fig. 6). A normal processing is to jump into all
contained methods (even when their parameters are not tainted)
and analyze them, because we cannot determine whether a
contained method uses a tainted static field or not. Analyzing
all contained methods on the backtracking paths certainly
slows down the analysis, and we have proposed a more elegant
solution. Specifically, whenever a new static field is tainted, we
launch a bytecode search of this field signature to capture all
methods that access this particular static field. Therefore, we
only need to analyze the contained methods that are matched
with our search results.
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Adding off-path static initializers into SSG on demand.
In Sec. IV-C, we introduced how to search over on-path static
initializers. Here we continue to explain how to accordingly
add off-path static initializers, i.e., those not in the backtracking
paths. Specifically, after the main taint process is done, if there
are still unresolved static fields in the SSG’s taint map, we
retrieve the corresponding classes and obtain their <clinit>
methods that are only implicitly executed by the Java/Android
virtual machine. We then perform the backward taint analysis
of these <clinit> methods, and add only relevant statements
into a special track of SSG. Fig. 6 presents such a track for the
MP3LocalServer.<clinit>() method, which captures
the value of an unresolved static field, <com.studiosol.
palcomp3.MP3LocalServer: int PORT>. During the
forward analysis, we will first analyze this special static track
and then handle the main track of SSG.
B. Forward Constant and Points-to Propagation over SSG
After producing a complete SSG, our forward analysis
iterates through each SSG node, analyzes each statement’s se-
mantic, and propagates dataflow facts through the constant [61]
and points-to [41] propagation during the graph traversal. We
now explain these forward analysis steps over our new SSG
structure.
Overall traversal process over SSG. As mentioned in
Sec. V-A, an SSG includes two tracks, the special static field
track and the normal track. Our traversal always starts with
the static field track so that we can resolve fields referred in
the normal track. For each track, we first retrieve a set of tail
nodes (e.g., the starting blocks in Fig. 6) and initialize analysis
from each of them. To record dataflow facts generated by our
analysis, we maintain fact maps for each analysis flow, but we
use only one global fact map for all static fields.
Whenever we reach at a new SSG node, we perform graph
traversal as follows. First, we determine whether the node is an
initial SSG node with a sink API call (e.g., the ending block
in Fig. 6); and if it is, we correlate and output dataflow facts
of all tainted parameters. For a normal SSG node, we first
jump into its invoked methods if any. After that, we analyze
the node itself and move to the next node(s).
Analyzing and modeling statement semantics. Dur-
ing the traversal of each SSG node, we parse its typed
bytecode statement and analyze the semantic. As shown
in Fig. 6, an SSG contains only three kinds of state-
ments to be handled, namely DefinitionStmt [6] (and
its subclass AssignStmt [4]), InvokeStmt [8], and
ReturnStmt [9]. We further analyze the statement ex-
pression embedded, which can be one of the six kinds of
statement expressions, including BinopExpr, CastExpr,
InvokeExpr, NewExpr, NewArrayExpr, and PhiExpr.
We then follow these expression instructions to understand
their semantics and calculate dataflow facts. In particular, we
mimic arithmetic operations and model Android/Java APIs
to handle two complicated expressions, BinopExpr [5] and
InvokeExpr [7].
Propagating constant and points-to information. To
facilitate the dataflow propagation, we maintain a fact map
to correlate each variable with its dataflow fact. Propagating
constant facts among different variables is easy — just retrieve
the value from an old variable and assign it to a new variable
in the fact map. To propagate object points-to information,
we design an object structure called NewObj to preserve the
original points-to information along flow paths. Each NewObj
object contains a pointer to its constructor class, a map of
member objects (in any class type) and their reference names.
Then we just need to propagate NewObj objects along flow
paths so that all corresponding objects being traced can point
to the same NewObj object. Inner members of NewObj can
also be updated by checking classes’ <init> methods or any
other value-assignment statements. Besides the class objects’
points-to information, we define an ArrayObj object to wrap
the points-to information of array expression and its array map
between indexes and values.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency and efficacy
of BackDroid in analyzing modern apps. In particular, we
compare BackDroid with Amandroid [63], [64], the state-of-
the-art Android static dataflow analysis tool. Both Amandroid
and BackDroid support the dataflow analysis of all kinds of
sink-based analysis problems, such as API misuse (e.g., [23],
[28]) and malware detection (e.g., [37], [49]). In contrast,
FlowDroid focuses only on the privacy leak detection that
involves both source and sink APIs, and thus it is not compared
here. Nevertheless, by comparing our BackDroid’s result pre-
sented in this section with the call graph generation result of
FlowDroid in Sec. II-C, we find that BackDroid still performs
much faster (2.13min v.s. 9.76min, on average).
A. Experimental Setup
To fairly evaluate both BackDroid and Amandroid, we se-
lect two common and serious sink-based problems, crypto and
SSL/TLS misconfigurations, which were also recently tested
by Amandroid in [64]. In both cases, the root cause is due
to insecure parameters. For example, the ECB mode is used
to create the javax.crypto.Cipher instance [28], [30],
[48] and the insecure parameter ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_
VERIFIER is used in setHostnameVerifier() [31],
[33], [60]. Note that these two kinds of sink APIs are fre-
quently invoked in our tested apps — on average, 21 sink API
calls in each app of our dataset, as we will show in Sec. VI-D.
In this way, we can stress-test the performance of BackDroid
even though we are targeting at just two problems. In the rest
of this subsection, we describe the dataset tested, computing
environment used, and tool parameters configured.
Dataset. We use a set of modern popular apps that satisfy
two conditions: they (i) have at least one million installs
each, and (ii) were updated in recent years. Specifically,
we first select all such 3,178 apps in our app repository
(see Table I in Sec. II) as our basic dataset. However,
not all of them contain the specific sink APIs, so we
pre-search them to filter out the apps with all three
target sink APIs, namely Cipher.getInstance(),
SSLSocketFactory.setHostnameVerifier(), and
HttpsURLConnection.setHostnameVerifier().
This is to help Amandroid avoid the unnecessary analysis,
as it has no bytecode search capability. Hence, the actual
performance gap between Amandroid and BackDroid for
analyzing all individual apps could be even larger than what
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we report in this paper. Eventually, we use the searched 144
apps for our experiments. The average and median size of
these apps are 41.5MB and 36.2MB, respectively, while the
largest and the smallest are 104.9MB and 2.9MB, respectively.
Environment. For the computing environment, we use a
desktop PC with Intel i7-4790 CPU (3.6GHZ, eight cores) and
16GB of physical memory. Note that a memory configuration
with 16GB or less is often used in many previous studies,
e.g., [53], [59], [75], [78]. To guarantee sufficient memory for
the OS itself, we assign 12GB RAM to the Java VM heap
space in running Amandroid. To demonstrate that BackDroid
is not sensitive to the amount of available memory, we use only
4GB (i.e., -Xmx4g). The OS is 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04, and we
use Java 1.8 and Python 2.7 to run the experiments.
Tool configuration. Both Amandroid and FlowDroid need
to configure a set of parameters to balance their performance
and precision. In contrast, BackDroid does not require specific
parameter configuration, since we have programmed its max-
imum capability in the code. In this paper, we use the default
Amandroid parameters (see its config.ini file), and use the
latest Amandroid 2.0.5 that supports the inter-procedural API
misuse analysis5. We also give Amandroid sufficient running
time with a large timeout of 300 minutes for each app.
B. Performance Results
Out of the 144 apps analyzed, both Amandroid and Back-
Droid successfully finished the analysis of 141 apps. For
Amandroid, the three failures are all due to its errors in
parsing the manifest, while for BackDroid, two failures are
caused by the format transformation from bytecode to IR (in
com.kbstar.liivbank and com.lguplus.paynow)
and one failure is a Soot bug in processing the com.lcacApp
app. In our evaluation, we thus do not count these failed apps.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the distribution of analysis time used
by BackDroid and Amandroid, respectively. By correlating
these two figures, we make the following three observations
on the performance of BackDroid and Amandroid.
First, BackDroid’s has no any timed-out failure, while the
timed-out failure rate in Amandroid is as high as 35%. Even
though we have set a considerably large timeout for Amandroid
(five hours for every single app), there are still as many as
50 apps timed out in Amandroid, as shown in Fig. 8. This
35% (50/141) timed-out failure rate indicates that Amandroid
is out of control in analyzing modern apps. In contrast, Fig. 7
shows that only three apps in BackDroid exceeded 30 minutes,
with 35min, 39min, and 81min, respectively. This suggests that
BackDroid’s analysis time is always under control even when
we are analyzing a set of large apps. In Sec. VI-D, we will
further analyze and show that BackDroid’s performance largely
depends on the number of sink API calls analyzed, instead of
the app/code size that existing tools are mainly affected by
(see Amandroid and FlowDroid’s own evaluation [17], [63]).
Second, BackDroid can quickly finish the analysis of most
of the apps, with 77% apps analyzed within 10 minutes and
even with one third of apps finished within just one minute.
5Amandroid after version 2.0.5 uses only the intra-procedural dataflow
analysis to analyze API misuse, see details at https://github.com/arguslab/
Argus-SAF/issues/55.
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Fig. 7: The distribution of analysis time in BackDroid.
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Fig. 8: The distribution of analysis time in Amandroid.
After analyzing the cases of long analysis time, we now focus
on the apps with short analysis time. According to Fig. 7,
BackDroid requires just one minute to analyze 30% (42) apps
each, and as high as 77% (108) apps can be quickly finished
within 10 minutes each. This gives BackDroid a great potential
to be deployed by app markets for online vetting. In contrast,
only 17% (24) apps can be analyzed by Amandroid within the
same time period, as shown in Fig. 8, and no app could be
finished within one minute.
Third, the overall performance of BackDroid, in terms of
the median time, is 37 times faster than that in Amandroid.
After studying apps that take relatively long and short analysis
times, we further analyze the overall performance. Since there
are 50 timed-out failures in Amandroid’s result, measuring the
average analysis time is not reliable. Hence, we analyze the
median time, and find that the performance gap between the
two tools is quite significant: the overall median time of all
141 apps analyzed in BackDroid is 37 times faster than that
in Amandroid (2.13min versus 78.15min).
Performance Takeaway: BackDroid achieves much better effi-
ciency than Amandroid, with the overall performance 37 times
faster, and with no timeout and much more quick analysis cases.
C. Detection Results
After comparing BackDroid’s and Amandroid’s efficiency,
we now analyze and compare their detection accuracy. We
present their detection results from two perspectives.
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Vulnerabilities detected by Amandroid but not Back-
Droid. We first analyze whether BackDroid could achieve
a close detection rate for the app vulnerabilities that are
detected by Amandroid. For the crypto API usage, Amandroid
detected that seven apps are still using insecure ECB mode.
We find that BackDroid can accurately detect all of them.
The buggy apps include the popular Adobe Fill & Sign app
(com.adobe.fas) and a bank app called IDBI Bank GO
Mobile+ (com.snapwork.IDBI). Both apps must guaran-
tee a secure encryption in their design. We have contacted
the vendors on these risky security issues. We also find that to
detect these seven vulnerable apps, Amandroid spent a total of
8.53 hours (73min on average), whereas BackDroid required
only 8.78 minutes (1.26min each), around 60 times faster.
Compared to the crypto API misuse, Amandroid detected
more SSL misconfigurations in our dataset, with 23 apps dis-
covered with the wrong SSL hostname verification. However,
our diagnosis shows that six of them are false positives. Among
the 17 true positives, BackDroid detected 15 of them and failed
on two apps. The detailed diagnosis results are:
• Four false positives from the ArmSeedCheck library:
Amandroid reported four buggy apps with a library called
com.skt.arm.ArmSeedCheck. However, three of
them do not trace back to entry functions, and the
sink flow of one app (kemco.hitpoint.machine)
originates from an Activity component (jp.kemco.
activation.TstoreActivation) not in manifest.
• Two false positives from the qihoopay library: Two
vulnerable apps with the com.qihoopay.insdk.
utils.HttpUtils library were reported by Aman-
droid. However, their sink flows similarly come from a
unregistered and thus deactivated Activity component.
• Two false negatives in BackDroid: Unfortunately, Back-
Droid failed on the com.gta.nslm2 and com.wb.
goog.mkx apps. The root cause for both cases is
that they do not directly invoke the system sink APIs,
which makes our initial bytecode search step fail to
locate their sink API calls. For example, the com.gta.
nslm2 app’s com.youzu.android.framework.
http.client.DefaultSSLSocketFactory class
extends the system API class org.apache.http.
conn.ssl.SSLSocketFactory and invokes the
setHostnameVerifier() API method only via its
own method signature. We will address this issue by
checking the class hierarchy also in the initial search.
Vulnerabilities detected by BackDroid but not Aman-
droid. We further find that for some apps, BackDroid can
achieve better detection than Amandroid. In particular, Back-
Droid discovered 54 additional apps with potentially insecure
ECB and SSL issues that were not detected by Amandroid.
By analyzing them, we identify four important factors (the last
two, with 18 apps, are fully due to Amandroid’s inaccuracy):
• Timed-out failures: 28 of the 54 failed apps were due
to the timeouts, where Amandroid did not finish their
analysis even after running 300 minutes each.
• Skipped libraries: Recall that Amandroid by default skips
the analysis of some popular libraries that are specified
in its liblist.txt configuration file. For this rea-
son, Amandroid failed to detect the ECB/SSL issues in
eight apps, which use the skipped Java packages from
Amazon, Tencent, and Facebook, such as com.amazon.
identity.frc.helper.EncryptionHelper and
com.tencent.smtt.utils.LogFileUtils.
• Unrobust handling of certain implicit flows: We surpris-
ingly find that Amandroid is not as robust as BackDroid
to handle certain asynchronous flows and callbacks. For
example, Amandroid failed to connect the flow from
AsyncTask.execute() to doInBackground()
and the callback from setOnClickListener() to
onClick() in some apps. Such unrobust handling ap-
peared in eight of the 54 apps.
• Occasional errors in its whole-app analysis: By inspect-
ing Amandroid’s debug logs, we observed some occa-
sional errors (e.g., “Could not find procedure” and “key
not found”) during the analysis of Amandroid, which
cause 10 apps fail to be detected. By nature, it is easier
for Amandroid’s whole-app analysis to encounter errors,
as compared with BackDroid’s targeted analysis.
Accuracy Takeaway: BackDroid achieves close detection effec-
tiveness for the apps that can be detected by Amandroid, and ob-
tains better detection results for the apps with long analysis time,
skipped libraries, and certain asynchronous flows/callbacks.
D. Further Measurement
After presenting performance and detection results, we
further quantify the relationship between the number of sink
API calls and BackDroid’s analysis time. This is to answer
the concern whether BackDroid could keep its performance
when analyzing a large number of sink API calls. Note that
we have tried to simulate such situation by targeting at the
sink APIs that are frequently invoked, as explained in Sec.
VI-A. On average, each app in our dataset contains 20.93 sink
API calls analyzed, the number of which should be enough
to simultaneously cover many other uncommon sink APIs like
sendTextMessage() [82], ServerSocket() [70], and
LocalServerSocket() [59].
In Fig. 9, we further plot the relationship between the num-
ber of sink API calls analyzed in each app and BackDroid’s
analysis time. We can see that the majority of them are at
a speed faster than 30 seconds per sink call. For example,
we can draw a straight line from the coordinate (0, 0) to the
coordinate (60, 1800), and only around ten dots are above
this line. Under this linear trend, BackDroid is expected to
finish the analysis of 100 sink calls with around 50 minutes
generally. Indeed, all apps, except one, were analyzed within
40 minutes. The only outlier, Huawei Health, costed 81min
for its 121 sink API calls, which is still much faster than the
300-minute timeout we assigned to Amandroid. This suggests
that BackDroid’s analysis time could be always under control.
To further improve BackDroid in analyzing a large number
of sink API calls, we will evolve the current per-sink SSG to
per-app SSG, as mentioned in Sec. V-A. In this way, we can
guarantee that no matter how many sinks there are, BackDroid
only requires to generate a partial-app graph once, which
would be still more efficient than existing whole-app graphs.
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Fig. 9: The relationship between the number of sink API calls in
each app and BackDroid’s analysis time.
VII. DISCUSSION
So far, we have elaborated our approach in the context of
Android bytecode. There are some common technical issues
in typical Android app analysis works, namely Java reflection,
native code, dynamically loaded code, and packed code. Al-
though addressing these issues is not our focus in this paper,
we discuss our plan to mitigate them in the future work.
Java reflection. Java reflection is a mechanism that can
dynamically and secretly invoke an Java API by setting dif-
ferent method parameters in reflection API calls. To mitigate
such effect for static analysis, an immediate solution is to
leverage DroidRA [43] to transform the original app to a
version without reflection calls. In the future, we will first
resolve reflection parameters using our on-the-fly backtracking
and then directly build caller edges to cache them.
Native code. To extend BackDroid’s design principle also
to native code [14], [45] and JNI (Java Native Interface) [38], a
potential way is to replace dexdump with objdump. Search-
ing over native code text might be different from bytecode
search, and we will explore it. Nevertheless, given the small
size of native code in Android apps and their limited entry
points, it is possible to launch full-scale forward analysis, as
demonstrated in the recent SInspector [59] and JN-SAF [62].
Dynamically loaded and packed code. Although static
analysis theoretically cannot handle dynamically loaded [54]
or packed [79] code, in practice, we can first leverage dynamic
analysis [66], [80] to extract those hidden code before running
BackDroid. Note that WebView code [44], [47], [67], [68]
could be handled in a purely static manner [56], [73], [74].
Besides these technical improvements, we can also extend
the current scope of BackDroid (i.e., targeted vetting of sink-
based API usages) and generalize its on-the-fly bytecode
search technique to other security problems involving both
sources and sinks, notably the privacy leak detection problem.
Specifically, we can first employ on-the-fly backward analysis
to determine the reachability of a source API call by tracing
from sources to entry points, and then launch on-demand
forward dataflow analysis starting only for those reachable
source calls to determine whether there is a leak from source to
sink. Since FlowDroid does not support sink-based API misuse
detection and BackDroid in this paper does not aim to analyze
privacy leaks, we thus do not compare them (except a rough
performance comparison shown earlier in Fig. 1 and 7).
VIII. RELATED WORK
With the background of Android static analysis introduced
in Sec. II-A, we now discuss more related works on the topics
of search-based program analysis, more scalable, and more
accurate Android static analysis in this section.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce
the search-based analysis to Android static program analysis.
We also study whether such a concept has been proposed in
other domains. The closest one is a work called “Search-Based
Program Analysis” [76], which was indeed a keynote speech
on the combination of search-based test case generation [15],
[21] and program analysis. Besides this software engineering
concept, security researchers leveraged conditional searches as
database queries to speed up the bug detection [32], [72] and
network security discovery [27] at a large scale. There are
two major differences between these works and our on-the-
fly bytecode search. First, our search is not a conventional
search like a graph/database/text search, but rather a bytecode
semantic-aware search. Second, we are the only one that
deeply embeds a code-level search into program analysis.
Some recent works [23], [52], [53] have also realized
the scalability difficulty in existing Android static analysis.
For example, because of the worry that it is slow to launch
complicated code analysis in a set of apps with the average size
of 8.43MB, HSOMiner [53] proposed to combine lightweight
program analysis with machine learning for the large-scale
detection of hidden sensitive operations. Similarly, in a recent
work by Bianchi et. al. [23], it stated the challenge in analyzing
recent real-world Android apps due to their large amount
of code. As a result, they performed intra-procedural type-
inference analysis to construct their whole-app call graph.
More recently, to speed up the cryptographic vulnerability
detection for massive-sized Java projects, CryptoGuard [55],
proposed the crypto-specific slicing that uses a set of domain
knowledge on top of the intra-procedural dataflow analysis of
Soot to balance the precision and runtime tradeoff.
Besides the performance, accuracy is a top concern of many
Android static analysis tools. Besides the widely-used Aman-
droid and FlowDroid, DroidSafe [35] and HornDroid [25]
are two representatives towards more accurate Android static
analysis. Specifically, DroidSafe provides a comprehensive
model of the Android runtime via a technique called accurate
analysis stubs and combines it with carefully designed inter-
procedural and ICC analysis. We also plan to incorporate such
analysis stubs into the forward object taint analysis part of
BackDroid (see Sec. IV-B). On the other hand, HornDroid
is essentially a symbolic execution tool with SMT constraint
solving. Despite these great efforts, a recent work, µSE [24],
found that technical inaccuracy still exists. Specifically, it used
systematic mutation to discover flaws, e.g., missing callbacks
and incorrect modeling of asynchronous methods, in all of
those four tools. In our evaluation of Amandroid in Sec.
VI-C, we also identified certain callbacks and asynchronous
flows missed by Amandroid. Besides µSE, two surveys [57],
[58] also tried to systematically assess the performance and
accuracy of existing Android static analysis tools.
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new paradigm of targeted
inter-procedural analysis by combining traditional program
analysis with our on-the-fly bytecode search. We implemented
this technique into a tool called BackDroid for targeted and ef-
ficient security vetting of modern Android apps. We overcame
unique challenges to search over Java polymorphism, asyn-
chronous flows, callbacks, static initializers, and Android inter-
component communication, and also adjusted the traditional
backward slicing and forward analysis over a structure called
self-contained slicing graph (SSG) for the complete dataflow
tracking. Our experimental results showed that BackDroid is
37 times faster than Amandroid and has no timeout (v.s. 35% in
Amandroid), while it maintains close or even better detection
effectiveness. In the future, we will enhance BackDroid to
search over Java reflection and native code, and also extend it
to other non-sink-based problems like privacy leak detection.
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